English as threat or resource in continental
The internationalisation and commodification of European higher education mean that
Danish universities, such as the one where I work, are increasingly expected to
run like businesses, to profile and market themselves competitively. One
symptom of this is an increasing use of English. This trend in communication in
the university world dovetails with comparable developments in commerce,
politics, the media, and youth culture, due to the impact of the interlocking
processes of Americanisation, globalisation and europeanisation.
The expansion of English is central to these processes, and influences local,
national and international languages and linguistic identities. I shall explore
some of the implications of this by reporting on some historical aspects of
European unification and Americanisation, some of the intrinsic paradoxes of
language policy in
In principle the European Union is strongly
committed to maintaining the cultural and linguistic diversity of
One of the
motive forces behind bringing the economies of European states together was to
establish forms of interdependence that would render military aggression
impossible. This was to be achieved by settling territorial disputes between
American goals have been explicit and
consistent since World War II. In 1948, the State Department’s senior imperial
planner, George Kennan, wrote: “We have 50 per cent
of the world’s wealth, but only 6.3 per cent of its population. In this
situation, our real job in the coming period is to devise a pattern of
relationships which permit us to maintain this position of disparity. To do so,
we have to dispense with all sentimentality… we should cease thinking about
human rights, the raising of living standards and democratisation”. President
Bush II is visibly cast in this mould, as clearly articulated by Condoleezza
Rice, his foreign affairs adviser: “The rest of the world is best served by the
The formation of the first EU institutions
thus involved a mixture of American and European motives. Some on both sides of
the
The principle of parity for the languages
of the participating states was established at this time, initially four, and
now eleven. The relative strength of French in EU affairs is attributable to
its earlier use in international relations, to the location of EU institutions
in cities in which French was widely used,
The British were ambivalent about joining
the EU because of their imperial links, and their belief that they have a
special relationship with the
The promotion of English worldwide has been
central to British and American global strategy since 1945[2],
the British Council playing a key role in maintaining the position of English
in postcolonial states, and in the post-communist world where globalisation was
preached through the trinity of the market economy, human rights, and English.
As the Annual Report of the British Council for 1960-61 states:
Teaching the
world English may appear not unlike an extension of the task which
The consequences of
According to some senior Americans, the world can simply dispense with all languages other than English. In 1997 the US ambassador to Denmark, who came straight from the corporate world, where else, was rash enough to say in my wife’s hearing at a luncheon at the University of Roskilde: “The most serious problem for the European Union is that it has so many languages, this preventing real integration and development of the Union.” A 1997 CIA report states that the following five years would be decisive in the establishment of English as the sole international language. The very idea that there is a single international language is of course nonsense. There are literally hundreds of international lingua francas in use, but the myth of the global use of English is widely believed in, especially by those who benefit from their proficiency in English, including academic cheer-leaders of linguistic globalisation.
George Monbiot’s
book, Captive state: The corporate
take-over of Britain (Macmillan, 2000), documents the many ways in which
corporate power determines national and local government policy in countless
fields, including agriculture, energy, the environment, urban planning, the
health system, university research, and general education. The consolidation of
an EU common market and monetary union has put into effect the wishes of the
corporate world, coordinated by the European Round Table of Industrialists, an
association of the chief executives of 46 of the biggest companies in
The Transatlantic Business Dialogue brings
together American and European corporations, and dovetails with the G8 and
related heads of state networks. There is increasingly a single state-corporate
structure. There are plans for a single market incorporating
Before long…only a minority of nations will lie outside a single, legally harmonised global market, and they will swiftly find themselves obliged to join. By the time a new world trade agreement has been negotiated, it will be irrelevant, for the WTO’s job will already have been done. Nowhere on earth will robust laws protecting the environment or human rights be allowed to survive. Elected representatives will, if these plans for a new world order succeed, be reduced to the agents of a global government: built, coordinated and run by corporate chief executives.
Despite this powerful trend, in which
English is pivotal, multilingualism is endorsed in countless EU pronouncements.
Decisions emanating from
Such questions, as well as the management
of multilingualism internally in EU institutions, have been subjected to
astonishingly little scholarly research. A recent doctoral study in
international law in the
It is worthwhile
to consider whether the EU should answer the call for uniformity on the issue
of language business transactions and further protect itself against the
potential onslaught of language regulation by each individual
She argues along predictable lines: rapid access to information, efficiency, saving money on translation, eliminating “national technical obstacles”, all arguments that relate to the producer rather than the consumer. She pleads for the termination of the “cultural protectionism of nations”, invokes the strong role of English in the world marketplace, and English as a widely learned foreign language (which is correct), English as the “common linguistic denominator” of all European countries (which is rubbish), and “U.S. advances in the areas of technology and science” (which we in Europe are supposed to be grateful for). The EU should act so as to prevent “one nation from frustrating the fundamental principles of the supranational governing body” (a comment which reveals little insight into the principles of EU decision-making). Her parting shot is that adopting a single language would serve, “to unify, rather than divide, Member States.” (op.cit., 202). Here is the monolingual worldview of Americanisation being subtly marketed as europeanisation under cover of globalisation.
Now it may well be that European governments are not waiting to follow this advice. Several have introduced or are contemplating legislation to resist the advance of English. However, the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law is presumably read by American corporate lawyers, who might choose to test the principle in court, and the outcome of any litigation in the European Court of Justice is unpredictable. But it appears that the Commission may be saving them the trouble and expense.
In July 2002 the Commission sent a “formal notice of complaint” (French “lettre de mise en demeure”) to the French government stating that the national requirement that food products should be labelled in French (following French legislation) is in conflict with Eurolaw. There has as yet been little litigation in this area, and the decisions are far from unambiguous[4], as indeed is the relevant Council directive[5] on the harmonisation of member states’ legislation on the labelling and packaging of food products. European case law is seen as holding that national law cannot require use of a specific language if the message can be expressed by other means, which can be another language that is easily comprehensible to the purchaser, possibly supported pictorially. The Commission’s intervention suggests that it is possible that the transition from a single market to a single marketing language has begun.
The Commission’s action is seen by many in
A second example that hit the headlines was
a proposal to change one of the internal translation procedures in the
Commission in
By this stage, press coverage had identified a “plot to impose English on the EU” (Irish Times), “Fischer and Védrine against more English” (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung), “Kinnock”s language plan riles the French” (The Independent), and so on. Much of the press coverage contains inaccurate statements about the present system and its costs, and engages in fanciful and nationalistic interpretation. The exchange of letters and the press reports clearly reveal that an existential nerve had been touched. The two disputes are perfect examples of the recurrent underlying tension between national interests and supranational ones, and the absence of adequate procedures and principles for resolving the issues.
I fear this is generally the case at the
supranational level, and often nationally, even in countries which have given
some thought to language policy, like
Many factors account for language policy not being handled more smoothly and competently.
·
There are major differences in
the ideologies underpinning the formation of states, and in the role ascribed
to language in these (the national romantic tradition, jus sanguinis, Herder, as in
·
Levels of awareness about
language policy issues range widely between and within each EU country. They
tend to be relatively high in, for instance,
· There is a poor scholarly infrastructure at European universities and research institutes for the analysis of language policy, multilingualism, and language rights, reflecting a lack of investment in this field.
· Responsibility for language policy in each country tends to be shared between ministries of foreign affairs, education, culture, research, and commerce. They each tend to have little expertise in language policy, and between them there is inadequate coordination, if any. In countries with a federal structure, responsibility is even more diffuse.
·
As English is used extensively
by native and non-native speakers from different parts of the world, there is
no simple correlation between English and the interests of a particular state.
The connection of English to the dominant economic system, and its entrenchment
as the most widely learned foreign language in schools (much more successfully
in northern than southern
A laissez faire policy thus involves major risks for all languages other than English. Leaving language policy to market forces, nationally and in the supranational institutions, is a recipe for more English and less of the other languages.
Clarifying whether the advance of English entails the submerging of other languages would require exploration of a range of language functions and contexts. As eleven languages are being used and developed in parallel in EU institutions, one can argue that all are being strengthened internationally, though not necessarily in equal measure, and without the hierarchy of languages being challenged.
I won’t go into the tricky question of the functioning of the translation or interpretation services, but merely mention that they are generally branded as excessively costly, whereas they in fact currently account for only 0.8 per cent of the total budget for all EU institutions, meaning 2 euros per year for each European citizen (which is peanuts compared with agricultural subsidies). This is a modest price to pay for a principle that use of the languages of each member state is an obligation, especially when preparing and agreeing on a constant stream of documents with the force of law in each member state.
The parity of the 11 official languages of
the EU is a complex question, which journalistic coverage of language issues,
typically triggered by a crisis of some sort, seldom does justice to[10].
Language policies in
· a legacy of “nation” states, “national” interests and languages, BUT supranational integration, and the internationalisation of many domains, commerce, finance, education, science, politics, and civil society in EU member states;
· the formal equality of EU member states and their languages, BUT a pecking order of states and languages, currently visible in the shift from French to English as the primary working language in EU institutions. The figures for draft documents reflect a dramatic shift over the past twenty years from mainly French to mainly English[11];
· the onward thrust of americanisation, cultural homogenisation (“McDonaldisation”), and the hegemony of English, BUT the celebration of European linguistic diversity, multilingualism, cultural and linguistic hybridity, and some support for minority and national language rights;
· languages seen as purely technical, pragmatic tools, BUT languages as existential identity markers for individuals, cultures, ethnic groups, and states;
· language policy as a matter of practical functioning, BUT language policy as “politically sensitive”, a coded way of politicians, eurocrats and diplomats acknowledging that they do not know how to reform the present regime, or improve EU internal and external communication, an issue which enlargement complexifies;
·
· English being promoted as a linguistic panacea, BUT of the 378 million citizens of the member states, only 61 million speak English as a mother tongue, less than half of the rest are proficient in English as a foreign language, and the proportion speaking it confidently varies greatly from country to country[12]. It is ironic that states invest heavily in the learning of a language that symbolises cultural imperialism, and awareness of the forms and mechanisms of cultural and linguistic imperialism is very patchy and often non-existent.
Clarity when discussing EU language policy is elusive because many of the central concepts are muddled and used inconsistently. I will give you three examples:
· In theory all eleven languages have the same status as official and working languages. In practice there tends to be a restriction of “working language” to French and English, and for certain purposes, German too. This terminological confusion (which is present in the letter written to Romano Prodi by the French and German foreign ministers referred to earlier) is symptomatic of an acceptance of a hierarchy of languages. Some languages are more equal than others.
· Secondly, “lingua franca” tends to be used as though there is equality between users of the relevant language, but is it likely that native and non-native speakers of French or English perform on a level linguistic playing-field? The innocuous label conceals the power dimension that privileges some and disadvantages others. Use of the mother tongue does not, of course, guarantee intelligibility. People who function regularly in several languages are more likely to be sensitive in their use of language in intercultural communication than monolinguals.
· Thirdly, the designations “native/non-native” take some users of the language as being authentic and infallible, and stigmatise others as not being the real thing. Work has begun in English as a Foreign Language teaching circles to describe and upgrade the English of continental Europeans, for several reasons[13]. English is used effectively by countless people for whom it is not a first language, so the “ownership” of English is changing, and perhaps these users should be seen as fluent users of a non-national, post-national language rather than as deficient users of mother-tongue English. This is an attractive principle, but whether it has any implications for language pedagogy is unclear. The assumed virtues of native speakers currently give them a colossal advantage, not least on the job market, and not only as language teachers. The Commission and the Council of Europe have been taken to task for illegitimately favouring native speakers of English when advertising posts that all EU citizens should have had equal access to. Monitoring this practice should be undertaken by the EU Ombud institution, but as yet its powers are tightly constrained.
So some of our basic concepts in language policy are misleading. Permeating the structural and ideological factors that snarl up analysis at the supranational level of language policy, there is the banal reality of people talking at cross-purposes, with or without the assistance of interpreters. The unresolved paradoxes remain. The challenge of more equitable, visionary language policies has yet to be met.
Participation in EU activities by vast numbers of civil servants, experts, academics, teachers, and NGOs, adds a supranational linguistic identity to the existing national linguistic identities. Confident users of English and French, whether as a first or second language, are in a privileged position. And needless to say, foreign languages can be learned successfully, even by the British and the French. In continental Europe, English has traditionally been learned additively, and until recently it has been difficult to imagine that speakers of German or Swedish run any risk of their mother tongues being marginalised or atrophying at the individual or group level. This picture may well be changing. This is due to the inroads English is making in many domains.
The cover of the European edition of Business Week of
English as the Tyrannosaurus Rex of
scientific communication[14]
is no extinct beast. In some faculties in
Two recent developments in the Nordic countries deserve special mention[16]. The Nordic Council of Ministers commissioned research in 2001 on possible domain loss in the Nordic languages, a laudable exercise, because while everybody seems to have an opinion on language policy, there is often a dearth of hard data actually documenting trends. The reports suggest that there is a risk of the Nordic languages suffering attrition in some domains, particularly in scientific and technological activity. The Swedish government also established a parliamentary commission to evaluate whether Swedish was under threat from English, and to elaborate an action plan to ensure that Swedish remains a complete language, learned and used well by its first and second language speakers, and retains its full rights as an EU official and working language. The plan also aims to ensure that Swedes are equipped to function well in foreign languages, particularly English, and that Swedes from a minority language background enjoy language rights. A massive national consultation process is currently under way, to lead to legislation in 2004. This nation-state is apparently shifting from monolingualism to a differentiated spectrum of multilingualism.
The EU has basically steered clear of the
issue, apart from needing to address the functioning of its institutions
internally and externally in a selected set of languages. The
Precisely what this “place” should be is
unclear because the issue of languages at the European level has not been
openly addressed. The topic is “explosive”, according to the chair of the group
of French members of the European Parliament, Pierre Lequiller,
at a meeting called to discuss on 11 June 2003 a Rapport sur
la diversité linguistique
au sein de l’Union européenne, prepared by Michel Herbillon.
The Convention on the Future of Europe did
not address language policy issues, even if the goals of recent EU reforms
include increasing accountability and better communication between EU
institutions and citizens. The Convention chose to ignore “Linguistic proposals
for the future of Europe”, submitted by the Europa Diversa[18]
group, which pleads for more active policies to strengthen linguistic
diversity, for funding for all autochthonous European languages, for the subsidiarity principle to ensure that power and
self-regulation in language affairs should be as decentralised as possible, and
for a public debate on reform of the language regime in EU institutions. The Convention also chose to
ignore a submission from Le droit de
Comprendre - Groupement d’associations pour l’action (Avenir de la langue française, Association pour la sauvegarde et
l’expansion de la langue française, Défense de la langue française, Résistance
à l’agression publicitaire) to the effect that
• Un domaine fondamental de la culture et de
l’identité des peuples a été passé sous silence par les autorités politiques, celui
des langues.
• Ce terrain abandonné a été investi par les
commissaires et les fonctionnaires de la Commission, ou des autres
institutions, pour imposer un choix linguistique, sans souci de l’avis des
citoyens et de leurs représentants. Ce choix se porte d’une manière évidente
sur l’anglais, langue unique de l’Europe.
On the European Day of Languages, 26 September 2003, the Comité
de coordination pour la démocratie linguistique en Europe (which includes a
substantial number of NGOs in France, Germany and elsewhere) launched the
Appeal L’EUROPE
SERA MULTILINGUE OU NE SERA PAS. Apart from some French government activity
early in 2003 stressing the use of French, the political world seems to be
paralysed in the field of language policy.
This immobility on the language issue is extremely worrying, as inaction can only serve to strengthen English and weaken other languages. In the internal affairs of EU institutions there are constant pressures to make savings in the administration of the translation and interpretation services. These pressures are increasing because of the imminent arrival of the languages of new member states. Different policies are need for the various functions and services that the EU provides. There is nothing odious about a restricted number of languages being used by permanent employees of an institution that brings together people from different backgrounds. Eurocrats can be expected to function in three languages, the mother tongue and two others, and this should be demanded particularly of those who have French or English as their mother tongue. In such employment, a higher level of proficiency can be expected in reading and listening than in writing or speaking. By contrast, it is unreasonable to expect representatives of member states, national politicians, civil servants and experts, to function as well in a foreign language as in their mother tongue. In theory they are not expected to do so, since interpretation and translation serve to facilitate interaction across language borders, and often do so impressively, but in practice there are many logistic problems in drafting complex texts in parallel in several languages, and having texts ready on time.
Change must tackle the fundamental
paradoxes in EU language policy, clarify the criteria that can lead to
equitable multilingual communication, and implement policy and practice that
respect linguistic human rights and strengthen linguistic diversity. There is
therefore an urgent need to bring together all the relevant stake-holders in
language policy. There is a lot of relevant experience worldwide, though far
too little is known to decision-makers nationally and supranationally.
Most of the books by social scientists on European integration devote very
little space to language policy and reveal gross ignorance. They tend to regard
an expansion of English as unproblematical. The
issues are, in my view, so complex that they need book-length treatment. My
book English-only
· national and supranational language policy infrastructure,
· EU institutions,
· language teaching and learning,
· research.
Hopefully recommendations will not merely remain informed speculation until the political will is generated bottom-up and top-down to move away from laissez faire and crude national agendas to a more inclusive agenda that converts the EU rhetoric of maintaining diversity into reality. No language is intrinsically evil or good. English can be used to ensure the emergence of a more equitable European linguistic order.
[1] Cited in Davies,
[2] Phillipson,
Robert 1992. Linguistic imperialism.
[3] Feld, S.A. 1998. Language and the globalization of the economic market:
the regulation of language as a barrier to free trade. Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law,
31: 153-202. The citation is from page 199.
[4] The relevant cases are
summarised in English-only
[5] 2000/13/EF, of
[6] On
[8] Décret no 2002-1025 du 1 août 2002 art 1, Journal Officiel du 2 août 2002. It is known as the “Decret Dutreil”.
[9] The ideology of French as a uniquely significant language, and France as “la mère des arts, des armes et des lois” (Joachim du Bellay, 1525-1560), passing by Rivarol and Voltaire, can be seen in French government circles, see Phillipson 2003, 45-47. On plans for strengthening French in EU institutions, under Francophonie auspices, see Phillipson 2003, 133-4.
[10] For instance, The Guardian on
[11] A further symptom is that publications in other languages are being dropped, e.g. the Annual Reports on competition policy were available in all official languages until 1995, the 1996 report was published in Dutch, English, French and German, and it is now published exclusively in English. <http:/europa.eu.int/comm/competition/annual_reports>.
[12] See Eurobarometer
Report 54 of
[13] Seidlhofer, Barbara 2001. Closing a conceptual gap: the case for a description of English as a lingua franca, International Journal of Applied Linguistics 11/2: 133-158.
[14] This is John Swales’s term, in an article in World Englishes in 1997.
[15] See the Vienna Manifesto, appendix 5 of Phillipson 2003.
[16] Both are summarised in Engelska språket som hot och tillgång
i Norden (The English
language as a threat or resource in the Nordic countries),
[17] See Tove
Skutnabb-Kangas 2000, Linguistic genocide in
education – or worldwide diversity and human rights?,
[18] Fourth draft,
[19] The book has been translated into Esperanto.